Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.22.66.6
Ascribing Proto-Intentions: Action Understanding as Minimal Mindreading
Chiara Brozzo
orcid.org/0000-0002-1217-1224
; University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
Sažetak
How do we understand other individuals’ actions? Answers to this question cluster around two extremes: either by ascribing to the observed individual mental states such as intentions, or without ascribing any mental states. Thus, action understanding is either full-blown mindreading, or not mindreading. An intermediate option is lacking, but would be desirable for interpreting some experimental findings. I provide this intermediate option: actions may be understood by ascribing to the observed individual proto-intentions. Unlike intentions, proto-intentions are subject to context-bound normative constraints, therefore being more widely available across development. Action understanding, when it consists in proto-intention ascription, can be a minimal form of mindreading.
Ključne riječi
Action understanding; mindreading; Minimal Theory of Mind; intentions; normativity.
Hrčak ID:
288526
URI
Datum izdavanja:
27.12.2022.
Posjeta: 448 *