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https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.23.67.4

Imagination, Thought Experiments, and Personal Identity

Michael Omoge orcid id orcid.org/0000-0002-6010-4093 ; University of Alberta – Augustana, Camrose, Canada


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 127 Kb

str. 69-88

preuzimanja: 144

citiraj


Sažetak

Should we descry the nature of the self from thought experiments? Shaun Nichols says ‘maybe,’ but only if we use thought experiments that do not recruit the indexical “I” (non-I-recruiting). His reason is that the psychology of “I” perforce mandates that imagination responds to thought experiments that recruit it (I-recruiting) peculiarly. Here, I consider whether he is correct about non-I-recruiting personal identity thought experiments. I argue positively using the same framework, i.e., considering the underlying psychology.

Ključne riječi

Propositional imagination; cognitive architecture; personal identity; thought experiments.

Hrčak ID:

301249

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/301249

Datum izdavanja:

6.5.2023.

Posjeta: 331 *