Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.26362/20230101
Misfiring: Tyler Burge Contra Disjunctivism
Vanja Subotić
orcid.org/0000-0002-9334-5766
; Institute of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
Sažetak
Recently, Charles Goldhaber (2019) has argued that Tyler Burge’s (2005, 2010, 2011) arguments against disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception fail when juxtaposed with the literature in perceptual psychology. In addition, Goldha- ber traces Burge’s motives for dismissing disjunctivism: his underlying theoretical assumptions vis-à-vis human rationality virtually force him to maintain that there is a genuine inconsistency between disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. While Goldhaber aims to defend epistemological disjunctivism à la John McDowell, my concern will be the other target of Burge’s attack, namely John Campbell’s (2002a, 2002b, 2011a) relationism. I will reexamine the Burge/Campbell debate concern- ing the role of perceptual psychology in theorizing about the nature of perception and the status of perceptual beliefs so that I can support Goldhaber’s stance that Burge’s plan to put the kibosh on disjunctivism backfires in the end. Finally, by using the challenge of cognitive penetrability, I show how Burge’s argumentation strategy can be turned against him.
Ključne riječi
cognitive penetrability; disjunctivism; perceptual beliefs; perceptual demonstratives; perceptual psychology; rationality; relationism
Hrčak ID:
304098
URI
Datum izdavanja:
14.6.2023.
Posjeta: 369 *