Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.26362/20240103
Moral Fictionalism vs Moral Abolitionism: Why it Makes No Sense to Continue Talking About Objective Morality If We No Longer Believe It Exists
Claire Herbert
Sažetak
After denying the existence of objective morality, the moral error theorist
faces a dilemma. Should they talk and behave as if it still exists, or should they attempt to eliminate morality from their language and judgements altogether? This dilemma is known as The Now What Problem. This paper explores two possible options available to the error theorist: moral fictionalism and moral abolitionism. It argues that fictionalism is unpersuasive because morality can only motivate us to override temptation if we believe it exists. If the error theorist has stopped believing in objective morality, then it would be redundant for them to continue pretending it exists. The paper will then argue that letting go of objective morality would not leave the error theorist without any reasons to continue acting in ways we deem moral, and they would likely make similar decisions, good or bad, in an abolitionist society. Ultimately, a society that no longer talks about objective morality may not look so different from our own.
Ključne riječi
J. L. Mackie; moral abolitionism; moral error theory; moral fictionalism; Richard Garner; Richard Joyce
Hrčak ID:
317603
URI
Datum izdavanja:
4.6.2024.
Posjeta: 554 *