Pregledni rad
https://doi.org/10.22598/iele.2024.11.1.10
PROTECTING SOCIOECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THE WEAKER PARTY IN THE FREE MARKET: THE EXPLOITATION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS IN THE TURKISH CONTRACT LAW
Kemal Atasoy
; Kadir Has University the Faculty of Law, Istanbul, Turkiye
Sažetak
Despite being the ultimate rule in the free market, the freedom of contract is fading away against the aim to protect the weaker party in contract law. The weaker party’s socioeconomic interest can be breached in a specific way that would be summarized as the exploitation of religious beliefs. This type of exploitation is usually seen across Turkish society, but there is almost no jurisprudence concerning this subject. The paper evaluates potential legal solutions from the Turkish Code of Obligations (TCO). Theoretical views are compared to achieve an adequate way of compensation against the stronger party for the weaker party whose pecuniary damages occurred because of the contract that the latter signed with religious thoughts and inexplicable generosity for the former. Common law’s undue influence and civil law’s sandpile theory can suggest founded solutions against religious exploitation in the contract. Still, TCO art. 27 can give a suitable cause for the illegality: the contrariety to economic public order. This notion can prevent copied future contracts against the same group of weaker parties when the pioneer illegal contract is invalidated, and the exploiter must compensate the pecuniary damages of the counterparty.
Ključne riječi
exploitation; weaker party; public order; vulnerability; sandpile theory; undue influence; freedom of contract
Hrčak ID:
318732
URI
Datum izdavanja:
30.6.2024.
Posjeta: 0 *