Review article
The fiasco of the JNA’s strategic campaign against Croatia in September 1991
Marijan Kostanjevac
Ivan Benković
Marijan Kretić
Abstract
After the declaration of Croatian independence in June 1991, the military leadership
of the Yugoslav People’s Army (INA) with the support of the Serbian political
leadership launched an offensive military operation in the fall of 1991 with the aim of
defeating and subjugating Croatia. The Offensive strategic plan of Kadijević’s JNA
military leadership to crush Croatia in fifteen days, experienced a collapse, and can be
classified as one of the worst military failures of the second half of the 20th century.
At the very beginning of the Homeland War, two events were decisive for the defense
of Croatia in September 1991. The first decisive influence on the survival of Croatia
in September 1991 was -occupation of military equipment and heavy weapon depot
of the JNA 32nd-Corps (Varaždin). The second crucial influence on the course of
military operations is the disintegration of 1. JNA guard division, better known as
Tito’s division, on the Posavina corridor.
The introductory part of the paper explains the extent of the armed rebellion in
Western Slavonia and the role it played in the plan of the JNA military leadership
to crush Croatia. The second part of the paper clarifies the main idea of Kadijević’s
strategic plan with the key directions of the attack on Croatia. The paper focuses on
the decision of the commander of the 1st JNA military district to attack Slavonia as
well as on the collapse of JNA main force on the Posavina corridor near Tovarnik and
Ilača.
Keywords
Hrčak ID:
322577
URI
Publication date:
30.9.2024.
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