Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.59014/HSPW1144
From Neurons to Emotions
Kasper Laegring
orcid.org/0000-0002-8189-3386
Sažetak
In recent years, neuroaesthetics has made its way into art history. Most notably,art historian David Freedberg and neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese havepromoted a theory based on the discovery of so-called mirror neurons. Inbrief, it has been shown that a mirror neuron fires an electrical signal bothwhen a movement is performed by one’s own body and when the same movementis observed in another body, in another individual. Gallese calls thiscircuit embodied simulation, and Freedberg, either alone or in collaborationwith Gallese, has taken these results and simply identified this effect withempathy. Building on the theory of embodied simulation, Freedberg hasgenerally contextualized artworks through a range of neuroscientific findings,including Antonio Damasio’s as-if body loop and Paul Ekman’s theory oflinking basic emotions with specific facial expressions. Altogether, this paradigmcan be called simulation theory.Freedberg’s resulting neuroaesthetic theory has some radical implications forthe analysis and interpretation of artworks, even for the practice of art historyitself. This article explores and challenges Freedberg’s assumptions and arguments,which are sought to be refuted, partly by consulting phenomenologyand the history of emotions. In particular, his peculiar concept of empathyis rejected, as it is limited to unconscious, pre-cognitive bodily automatism.The article examines his selection of artworks and finds that the scope ofhis theory makes it challenging to apply to modern and contemporary art. Italso takes issue with Freedberg’s atomistic style of analysis, where specificbody segments, forms of gestures, and facial expressions, as well as motifs of movement, are isolated from their compositional context and identifiedas the meaning and message of the image itself. Similarly, the article faultsFreedberg’s dependence on Paul Ekman’s tautological attempts to locate aset of basic emotions in the face, not observed but predefined.The article then moves on to first provide an account of the promising resultsgenerated by the intersection of art history and emotional history in recentdecades. It subsequently uncovers how Freedberg ignores these recent findingsand how the history of emotions challenges the neuroaesthetic perspectiveon emotions in artworks, at least in the form represented by Freedbergand Gallese.The article goes on to discuss how Freedberg’s theory fails to distinguishbetween art and reality or between art, kitsch, and propaganda. Avant-gardeconcepts like estrangement and shock are introduced to demonstrate thatthe application of Freedberg’s approach—his peculiar concept of empathy—would lead to misinterpretations of the aesthetic message of avant-garde art.Finally, the article argues that Freedberg’s neuroaesthetics lacks aestheticexplanatory power and fundamentally deprives artworks of meaning. It alsoreturns to his concept of empathy, which is challenged through both emotional-historical and neuroscientific approaches. Overall, the article concludesthat while the emergence of emotions as objects of study in art history andaesthetics is a positive and promising correction to traditional ways of studyingartworks, Freedberg’s theory is of little assistance when explaining theoccurrence and function of empathy and emotions in aesthetic phenomena.
Ključne riječi
Hrčak ID:
326990
URI
Datum izdavanja:
17.1.2025.
Posjeta: 677 *