Other
Measuring Fine-Based Competition Authority Activity Efficiency in CEE Countries
Marko Družić
; Faculty of Economics & Business, University of Zagreb, Zagreb, Croatia
*
* Corresponding author.
Abstract
This paper examines the activity efficiency of competition authorities in Central and Eastern European countries by developing a simple, externally verifiable fine-to-budget indicator. The study focuses on the directly measurable segment of competition authority activity: competition-related fines imposed in the areas of abuse of dominance, cartels, and merger violations, relative to the budget allocated to competition-related activities. Using a novel dataset constructed from national competition authority reports and OECD submissions, the paper compares seven CEE countries - Croatia, Czechia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia - over the period 2014–2023. The results reveal substantial heterogeneity across the region. Croatia and Slovenia display low fine-based activity-efficiency levels, while Czechia, Poland, and Slovakia exhibit relatively high and stable performance. Latvia and Lithuania also show high average ratios, but with greater variability, indicating more episodic enforcement patterns.
Keywords
competition authority; enforcement activity; fine-to-budget ratio; competition policy; CEE countries; institutional efficiency
Hrčak ID:
348747
URI
Publication date:
2.7.2026.
Visits: 0 *