Bogoslovska smotra, Vol. 96 No. 2, 2026.
Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.53745/bs.96.2.4
Individual and Structural Dimensions of Epistemic Injustice: A Thomistic Approach
Kristina Lekić Barunčić
orcid.org/0000-0003-3921-4391
; Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences University of Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia
Abstract
The phenomenon of epistemic injustice, understood as injustice committed against individuals or groups in their capacity as knowers, occupies a central place in contemporary social epistemology and political philosophy. Drawing on Miranda Fricker’s influential analysis, the paper examines the limitations of her notion of »hybrid virtues« as a proposed solution to epistemic-moral deviations stemming from prejudice and stereotypes. Although Fricker’s theory establishes the normative importance of individual virtues, it proves insufficient in confronting structural, institutionally embedded forms of injustice. In this context, Thomas Aquinas’s approach proves theoretically productive
because it offers an original contribution to understanding the relationships between individual virtues and social structures. Aquinas’s understanding of prudence (prudentia) and docility (docilitas) enables us to conceive of epistemic virtues as shared and relational, rather than simply as isolated individual qualities. This makes possible an integration of scholastic ethics with the theory of epistemic injustice, thereby providing a complementary perspective that unites individual responsibility and structural dimensions of justice.
Keywords
epistemic injustice; institutions; virtues; prudence; docilit; Thomas Aquinas
Hrčak ID:
350586
URI
Publication date:
7.9.2026.
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