Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 29 No. 2, 2014.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Joint Attention and Understanding Others
Michael Schmitz
; University of Vienna, Institute for Philosophy, Vienna, Austria
Sažetak
In this paper I criticize theory-biased and overly individualist approaches to understanding others and introduce the PAIR account of joint attention as a pragmatic, affectively charged intentional relation. I argue that this relation obtains in virtue of intentional contents in the minds of the co-attenders, and – against the received understanding of intentional states as propositional attitudes – that we should recognize what I call ‘subject mode’ and ‘position mode’ intentional content. Based on findings from developmental psychology, I propose that this subject mode content represents the co-attenders as co-subjects, who are like them and who are at least disposed to act jointly with them. I conclude by arguing that in joint attention we experience and understand affective, actional and perceptual relations at a non-conceptual level prior to the differentiation of mind and body.
Ključne riječi
joint attention; collective intentionality; other minds; intentionalism; mind-body dualism
Hrčak ID:
142420
URI
Datum izdavanja:
24.4.2015.
Posjeta: 2.662 *