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FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS ACCORDING TO HOHFELD: SIGNIFICANCE, PURPOSE, TRANSLATION

Ivana Tucak ; Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta Josipa Jurja Strossmayera u Osijeku
Ivan Padjen ; Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Rijeci


Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 11.119 Kb

str. 7-20

preuzimanja: 1.013

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Sažetak

The fundamental legal conceptions according to Hohfeld (right, duty etc.), and/or the entities the conceptions refer to (again: rights, duties etc.), are theoretically relevant for two reasons. The first is Hohfeld's claim that the conceptions are the elementary building blocs of law. The second is inadequate knowledge of the alleged elementary nature of the conceptions due to a disproportion between two kinds of inquiries into law, namely, logical (undertaken chiefly by philosophers) and ontological (carried out mainly by lawyers). Hohfeld's conceptions, although derived from the Anglo-American Common law, make sense also to Croatian lawyers. For reasons of clarity and style, rather than linguistic purity, all of Hohfeld's terms can and should be translated into Croatian language.

Ključne riječi

Newcomb Hohfeld; fundamental legal conceptions

Hrčak ID:

110982

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/110982

Datum izdavanja:

30.4.2013.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski njemački

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