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NATURAL LAWS IN THE SHADOW OF NATURAL RIGHT: THE DOUBLE LINE OF ARGUMENT IN LEVIATHAN
Luka Ribarević
; Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Sažetak
In this article the author wants to prove that Hobbes’ theory of the
state cannot be reduced to a logical construction, which – completely
abstracted from the ethical content – approaches the problem of overcoming destitution in the state of nature as a problem of mechanics of forces. The existence of a powerful sovereign, who guarantees peace by forcing his subjects to obey, is not sufficient for the reinstatement of a lasting civil state. The author believes that it is possible to differentiate two lines of argument in Leviathan. The first one begins from the basic value of self-preservation and natural law derived from it, which is both the cause of the conflict in the state of nature and also the basis for overcoming this conflict. However, Hobbes cannot derive the conditions of maintaining the civil state from the state of nature.
What is necessary is the second line of argument which is based on the notion of natural law. The content of natural law is a moral
doctrine, on whose acceptance rests the conditions for creating and
maintaining common life. Its significance is derived from Hobbes’
fundamental insight that power itself cannot ensure permanent guarantee of safety. The author concludes that Hobbes’ Leviathan cannot sustain itself, if both subjects and the sovereign are not bound by a moral sense of the importance of natural laws.
Ključne riječi
the state; sovereignty; the state of nature; natural laws; natural right; Hobbes
Hrčak ID:
20591
URI
Datum izdavanja:
12.7.2006.
Posjeta: 3.195 *