Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.25234/pv/12837
CIVIL LAW REGULATION OF LOBBYING ACTIVITIES
Davorin Pichler
; Faculty of Law, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, Stjepana Radića 13, 31000 Osijek, Republic of Croatia
Abstract
The Republic of Croatia does not have a legal framework for regulating lobbying activities. With the adoption of regulations governing lobbying, this informal activity is translated from the “grey zone” into an activity under the “watchful eye” of the competent authorities. Although there is a large amount of professional and scientific literature on the concept and activity of lobbying, it can be noticed that the academic community is much less concerned with the legal institute of lobbying contract, its classification, characteristics and content. The lobbying contract in the wider context of the Croatian science of civil law and legal practice, comprises the features of certain legal transactions, primarily a contract for services / or a mandate contract. The object of performing a lobbying contract is the execution of a lobbying activity, as a rule for a consideration, and in that sense, it represents a specific form of a contract for services. The mandate contract features found in the formation of the lobbying contract will also be emphasized. The paper aims at presenting the basic features of the lobbying contract and emphasizing certain outstanding issues that may arise in any legal regulation of this legal act in the Republic of Croatia. The comparative approach in the paper points to legal solutions applied by legal systems with a long lobbying tradition as a legitimate part of the legislative process. It also points out the plausible solutions that have emerged from the legal systems of predominantly former communist and transition countries, and which are all the more adequate to possible Croatian lobbying contract regulation.
Keywords
contract; lobbying; lobbyist; contracting client; public register
Hrčak ID:
261167
URI
Publication date:
31.7.2021.
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