Original scientific paper
https://doi.org/10.31141/zrpfs.2025.62.155.1
Between Apparency and Indeterminacy
Víctor García Yzaguirre
orcid.org/0000-0002-4662-2919
; University of Girona
Marin Keršić
orcid.org/0000-0002-0964-4625
; Faculty of Law, University of Split
Abstract
The concept of prima facie norms is frequently used in legal theory but remains ambiguous, encompassing both epistemic and normative interpretations. This article examines these dual meanings to clarify their implications for legal decision-making. The epistemic sense views prima facie norms as provisional obligations arising in contexts of incomplete information. Such norms require further inquiry to confirm their applicability, ensuring that legal determinations are based on all relevant conditions. In contrast, the normative sense addresses conflicts between norms, highlighting the absence of inherent hierarchies to resolve such disputes. This perspective necessitates an evaluative framework to prioritise one norm over another, allowing for justified resolutions based on broader principles or contextual considerations. The article also explores practical distinctions between these interpretations. In the epistemic sense, norms deemed irrelevant to a case are excluded without implying violation. Conversely, the normative sense recognises that unresolved conflicts may result in norm violations, generating moral residue or compensatory obligations. These differences illustrate how prima facie norms function as mechanisms for navigating legal indeterminacies.
Keywords
legal reasoning; norms; normative conflicts; indeterminacy; prima facie
Hrčak ID:
331238
URI
Publication date:
31.3.2025.
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