Review article

Jackson on Perceiving Physical Objects: Analysis and Critique

Ljudevit Hanžek ; Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Splitu, Split, Hrvatska *
Gabriela Bašić Hanžek ; Filozofski fakultet, Sveučilište u Splitu, Split, Hrvatska

* Corresponding author.

Abstract

Frank Jackson, in his book Perception from 1977, espouses several arguments in favour
of sense–data theory of perception, which claims that we always directly perceive
mental entitites, sense–data. In this paper, we analyze one such argument, containing
multiple steps, according to which: a) direct perception of a physical object is impossible
and b) it is impossible that a physical object has colour, contrary to experience.
Regarding the first part of the argument, we claim that Jackson misinterprets the
»in virtue« of grammatical construction, and instead of indicating the mechanism
of mediation of some action, it often simply specifies the action in more detail. Regarding
the second part of the argument, we find that it seems to presuppose certain
ideas, some of which are controversial. Specifically, the argument presupposes the
phenomenality of colour, the claim that colours are the phenomenal properties that
form the part of colour experience. We argue that this claim leads to counterintuitive
consequences, such as physical items being intermittently coloured. Thus, we argue,
the whole argument is problematic and unsuccessful.

Keywords

perception; direct perception; colour; phenomenal

Hrčak ID:

347273

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/347273

Publication date:

1.7.2026.

Article data in other languages: croatian

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