Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 29 No. 2, 2009.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Internalism about Reasons: Two Interpretations
Matej Sušnik
; Sveučilište u Rijeci, Filozofski fakultet, Rijeka, Hrvatska
Sažetak
Internalists about reasons argue that the presence of a motive is a precondition for the existence of a reason. According to the Humean interpretation of this view, reasons for action are always relative since their existence depends on the arbitrary elements which form one’s subjective motivational set. One of the greatest challenges to Humean internalism is the Kantian interpretation of the internalist position. The main intention of Kantian approach is to prove the possibility of rational motivation and thus deny Humean internalism. In this article I critically examine this discussion and attempt to defend Humean internalism against one contemporary Kantian proposal.
Ključne riječi
normative reasons; motivating reasons; rationality; internalism; externalism
Hrčak ID:
41413
URI
Datum izdavanja:
21.7.2009.
Posjeta: 2.507 *