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Original scientific paper

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp36210

Toward a Broader Conception of “Liberal Naturalism”: Widening the Perspective

Nikolaj Pilgaard Petersen orcid id orcid.org/0000-0003-1581-9708 ; Lundshøjvej 26B, DK–8270 Højbjerg


Full text: english pdf 421 Kb

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Full text: croatian pdf 421 Kb

page 458-458

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Full text: german pdf 421 Kb

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Full text: french pdf 421 Kb

page 459-459

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Abstract

The term naturalism is often used to refer to reductive naturalism and is therefore closely linked to physicalism. Various forms of liberal naturalism have been developed as an alternative to reductive naturalism. This paper argues that a further broadening of the concept of naturalism is helpful. A “broad” liberal naturalism is advocated, in which the criterion for naturalistic is not tied to the premise of a specific metaphysics, but to what arguably constitutes naturalism as such: the presence of universal fundamental principles about how the world operates and of regularities or laws of nature describing the concrete behaviour of the world. This type of naturalism allows for the inclusion of non-materialist metaphysics, such as forms of dualism and idealism. This finding is significant because the physicalist position falls short on several issues, most notably the adequate handling of the problem of consciousness. Given the positive connotation of the predicate naturalistic, such inclusion seems helpful in legitimising the potentially fruitful exploration of less conventional alternatives to physicalism and materialism. Moreover, this could prove valuable not only from a theoretical or academic perspective but also from an existential one.

Keywords

idealism; laws of nature; liberal naturalism; naturalism; physicalism; metaphysics

Hrčak ID:

280208

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/280208

Publication date:

20.1.2022.

Article data in other languages: croatian german french

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