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Preliminary communication

https://doi.org/10.46672/aet.8.2.1

Compliance Behaviour in Europe in the Early Stages of the Covid-19 Pandemic: What Can We Learn from Game Theory and Experimental Economics?

Žiga Velkavrh orcid id orcid.org/0000-0003-0764-7838 ; Department of Mathematics, Faculty of Mathematics, Natural Sciences and Information Technologies and Andrej Marušič Institute, University of Primorska, Slovenia


Full text: croatian pdf 524 Kb

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Full text: english pdf 524 Kb

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Abstract

Studies across Europe have shown that in the early phases of the COVID-19 pandemic people did not fully comply with preventive measures and recommendations given by the authorities. As evidenced, compliance rates may depend on many different factors, including personality traits, gender, age, and even irrational beliefs in conspiracy theories. These findings highlight heterogeneity among people and, in combination with insights from game theory and experimental economics, suggest that it would be difficult to sustain high compliance rates and prevent the spread of the deadly virus without imposing stricter measures that were adopted later.

Keywords

compliance behaviour; COVID-19; Europe; experimental economics; game theory

Hrčak ID:

288227

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/288227

Publication date:

22.12.2022.

Article data in other languages: croatian

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