Psihologijske teme, Vol. 33 No. 2, 2024.
Pregledni rad
https://doi.org/10.31820/pt.33.2.8
Rationality and (Ideological) Belief Polarization
Marina Maglić
; Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Andrea Vranić
; Odsjek za psihologiju, Filozofski fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, Hrvatska
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* Autor za dopisivanje.
Sažetak
In a world inundated with information our capacity for rational thinking is often put to the test. In this paper we give a theoretical and empirical review of the literature explaining when and why our beliefs diverge from empirically founded knowledge and facts, especially in the context of ideological polarization. Two key perspectives are presented that reveal the reasons for our deviation from epistemic accuracy, i.e., bounded rationality and expressive rationality. Starting from the framework of dual-process theories for understanding individual differences in rationality, we consider two theses regarding the role of analytical reasoning in the (non)acceptance of epistemically founded evidence and facts subject to ideological polarization. Different interpretations of scientific facts and related evidence form the basis for making social policies and decisions and carry profound consequences for the daily life of individuals and society at large. The complexity of the relationship between analytical thinking and ideological polarization highlights the necessity for a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach to furthering advancement in this field.
Ključne riječi
rationality; dual-process theory; belief polarization; reasoning; motivated cognition
Hrčak ID:
319366
URI
Datum izdavanja:
18.7.2024.
Posjeta: 0 *