The Causes, Flow, and Consequences of Operation ‘Trebević 2’

Abstract

In October 1993, the Muslim political and military leadership, with the full support of the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, planned and implemented a military-police operation that was, officially, supposed to introduce order among the ‘renegade’ commanders of the 9^th Motorised and 10^th Mountain Brigades of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AB&H). However, a reconstruction of the events that led up to the initiation of the mentioned operation casts doubt on the official version of the events. Namely, the Muslim political and military leadership had been aware of certain inappropriate activities of some units under its command as early as the first half of 1993, but failed to take any concrete actions to sanction them. On the contrary, despite being clearly aware of these problematic activities, the leadership of the AB&H continued to use such units in combat. In September 1993, parts of these units were actively involved in the operation ‘Neretva 93’, during which war crimes were committed against Croatian civilians in the village of Grabovica on 8 and 9 September.

After a meeting held on 4 October 1993, the Muslim leadership headed by Izetbegović reached a decision to deal with the problematic military commanders of the AB&H and a part of the units under their control. However, this process of facing the criminal activities performed by members of the AB&H concealed the real conflict, which was the conflict about who had supreme influence over the army and in politics, and was actually between Izetbegović and the leader of the AB&H Chief of the General Staff, Sefer Halilović. The successful results of operation ‘Trebević 2’ left Izetbegović without any serious challengers to his authority.