The Ethnic Discourse in the Serbian Opposition Press: Demokratija and Srpska reč, 1990–1991

Abstract

A statistical analysis of the presence of ethnic discourse (ED) and its subcategory, discourse of ethnic intolerance (DEI), in the party organs Demokratija and Srpska reč shows the indisputably different political character and physiognomy of these two papers. Namely, the average presence of ED in the Srpska reč in the period from June 1990 to June 1991 was four times higher, and the prevalence of DEI ten times higher, than in the Demokratija. In addition to the varying prevalence and character of their ED content, these two organs were fundamentally different as regards the character of their remaining contents. In the Serbian Renewal Movement’s organ, the predominant part of the remaining discourse consisted of revisionist serials and essays dedicated to promoting the Chetnik Movement. These texts made up as much as half of the contents of individual issues of the monthly Srpska reč. Putting together all the pro-Chetnik contents and the ED contents of the Srpska reč, we can conclude that, on average, over 60 percent of each issue’s contents were exceptionally irrational, conservative, and nationalist.

On the other hand, after its first few issues, the Demokratija preserved an ethic of responsibility and a critical stance towards the social reality and political situation in the country. After these first few issues, the ethnic discourse in this organ was present only as a precedent and derailment, and was not a commonplace of political rhetoric, unlike in the case of the Srpska reč. The leadership of the Democratic Party certainly played a role in setting up these standards of civil discourse in this organ but, paradoxically, it often also took responsibility for sharpening the ‘national’ line of reasoning within the frame of (forced) political pragmatism. Đinđić’s or Mićunovićev’s ethnic discourse from August 1990 and May 1991 was not supported by a corresponding change in the physiognomy of the paper, which remained predominantly rational, critically oriented, civil, and socially responsible.

The analytical verification of facts in this paper certainly supports the thesis of Dubravka Stojanović from 1996 that there was no alternative to this programme in Serbia, at least not within the frame of these two most relevant opposition parties. Furthermore, this paper indicates that, in the summer and autumn of 1990 and in May 1991, the rhetoric of the party leaders of the Serbian Renewal Movement and Democratic Party attempted to be—and often was—more belligerent than Milošević’s. As regards almost all questions of the internal order of Yugoslavia, and especially regarding the status of the autonomy of Kosovo and the regulation of the position of Serbian people outside Serbia, the solutions advocated by the opposition were more radical than the ones advocated by Slobodan Milošević’s regime.