A Universe from Nothing and Cosmological Arguments

Abstract

The aim of the paper is to analyse some conceptual and logical relations between the notion of the spontaneous arising ex nihilo of the Universe and the so–called cosmological arguments for the existence of the First Cause. In the first section, it is argued that no scientific theory could in principle describe the Universe’s coming into being from nothing. In the second, three standard classes of cosmological arguments are analysed, and it is claimed that the first phase of every cosmological argument is based on three central premises, including what is termed in the paper ʻthe principle of explanationʼ and ʻthe principle of foundationʼ. The role of the principle of explanation is to exclude, as metaphysically impossible, relevant kinds of brute facts, and the role of the principle of foundation is to deny the explanatory completeness of certain non–well–founded explanatory chains. In the final section of the paper the notion of coming into being from nothing is given a more precise meaning. It is then argued that the conjunction of the two metaphysical principles in any variant of the cosmological argument excludes the metaphysical possibility that the Universe spontaneously came into being from nothing and that defending the metaphysical possibility of the Universe’s arising from nothing therefore commits one to reject either the explanatory principle or the foundation principle. Finally, it is suggested that either option comes at a high metaphysical price.