On Sextus’ Criterion of Skepticism

Abstract

This article closely examines the criterion, aim and main basic principle of the Skeptic School by focusing primarily upon the issues that Sextus Empiricus addressed in his renowned work titled, Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The discussion will be centered on the question of what ‘adhering to appearances’ means which, according to Sextus, serves as the criterion or standard of action for those who do not adhere to dogmas, and secondly, what would be the nature of such a life and the direct consequences thereof? It is the author’s opinion that the skeptical life, as depicted in the first volume of Outlines of Pyrrhonism is deficient, undesirable and in fact an impossibility for human beings, and that the end result of the skeptic’s endeavours is not worth abandoning one’s knowledge for. By broadening Sextus’ notion of τἀ φαινόμενα, while retaining his critique of doctrinal philosophy, the author argues from a moderate Kantian perspective, that skepticism is not the only acceptable mode of philosophical inquiry, and that there exists a course which would maintain the possibility of knowledge in the essential areas of human life without sinking into dogmatism.