Pregledni rad

https://doi.org/10.21464/fi42108

Is a Particular Platonic Argument Threatened by the “Weak” Objectivity of Mathematics?

Vladimir Drekalović orcid.org/0000-0001-9046-1596 ; Univerzitet Crne Gore, Filozofski fakultet, Danila Bojovića bb, ME–81400 Nikšić

Sažetak

In 2020, Daniele Molinini published a paper outlining two types of mathematical objectivity. One could say that with this paper Molinini not only separated two mathematical concepts in terms of terminology and content, but also contrasted two mathematical-philosophical contexts, the traditional-idealistic and the modern-practical. Since the first context was the theoretical basis for a large number of analyses that we find in the framework of the philosophy of mathematics, the space was now offered to re-examine such analyses in the second context. More specifically, with respect to the second context, we will analyse the strength of one of the few explicit Platonic arguments (the “Enhanced Indispensability Argument”) that seeks to justify the ontological status of mathematical objects and the central claim of mathematical Platonism about the existence of mathematical objects.

Ključne riječi

mathematical Platonism; mathematical objectivity; enhanced indispensability argument; Alan Baker; Daniele Molinini

Hrčak ID:

281090

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/281090

Datum izdavanja:

17.7.2022.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 1.541 *