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https://doi.org/10.21464/fi43402

Heisenberg’s Critique of the Principle of Causality Viewed in the Light of Kant’s Distinction between Perceptual and Experiential Judgments

Saša Laketa orcid id orcid.org/0009-0004-3407-1760 ; Univerzitet u Banjoj Luci, Filozofski fakultet, Bulevar vojvode Petra Bojovića 1a, BA–78000 Banja Luka


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Abstract

In this paper, we will question Heisenberg’s claim that the unpredictability of the experimental findings of quantum physics also affects the self-evident attitude about the universal and necessary nature of the principle of causality. We will try to answer the aforementioned problem by confronting Heisenberg’s criticism of Kant’s position on the universal and necessary/absolute nature of the principle of causality with Kant’s distinction between perceptual and experiential judgments. The distinction between perceptual and experiential judgments reveals that even in Heisenberg’s experimental results that indicate the smallest degree of expectation, predictability, or uniformity of natural events, universal and necessary conditions of knowledge to which Heisenberg denies absolute value still preexist.

Keywords

causality; Werner Heisenberg; universality; necessity; predictability; Immanuel Kant; time; observation; experience

Hrčak ID:

317238

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/317238

Publication date:

21.5.2024.

Article data in other languages: croatian

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