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Pregledni rad

https://doi.org/10.21860/j.16.2.7

Artificial intelligence, consciousness, singularity: A critique of functionalism and computationalism as viable models of (machine) consciousness

Jurica Grgić orcid id orcid.org/0009-0003-6707-4995 ; Nezavisni istraživač, Čakovec, Hrvatska. *

* Dopisni autor.


Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 179 Kb

str. 377-404

preuzimanja: 149

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Sažetak

Discussions on consciousness in artificial intelligence are often grounded in computational functionalism – the assumption that performing the appropriate computational processes is sufficient for the emergence of consciousness. Scientists such as Ben Goertzel and Joscha Bach defend this position, arguing that functional architecture, regardless of physical substrate, is key to understanding the mind. Thomas Metzinger, while open to the possibility of machine consciousness, warns of its profound ethical implications and advocates a moratorium on the development of phenomenally conscious systems until adequate ethical frameworks are in place. Numerous thinkers – including Ned Block, Mark Solms, and David Bentley Hart – have pointed to the theoretical and ontological shortcomings of functionalist and computational approaches. Block emphasizes the biological grounding of consciousness, while Solms contends that without affective components, artificial systems cannot possess a mind. Hart’s critical intervention rejects the mechanistic metaphysics underlying such models. He argues that artificial intelligence, though effective at simulating intentional behavior, remains ontologically incapable of consciousness, moral interiority, or reflexivity – rendering it ethically inert and unaccountable. Hart’s critique underscores that behind the façade of rationality and efficiency lies a technocratic model of power: AI does not represent conscious volition but rather the impersonal logic of Capital, which obscures ethical responsibility and deepens structural injustice.

Ključne riječi

consciousness; artificial intelligence; functionalism; computationalism; the analogy between mind and machine

Hrčak ID:

344182

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/344182

Datum izdavanja:

6.2.2026.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 481 *