G. A. Cohen’s Critique of the Pareto Argument in Rawls’s Theory of Justice — Equality is not requiredG. A. Cohen’s Critique of the Pareto Argument in Rawls’s Theory of Justice — Equality is not required

Abstract

G.A. Cohen addresses several significant objections to J. Rawls' theory of justice and among them, one is related to Rawls' version of the Pareto argument. This article discusses the objection, shows its weaknesses through different perspectives of the following scholars – P. Casal, S. Meckled Garcia and A.R.J. Fisher/ E.F.McClennen and finally, gives a new insight in Cohen's arguments. Cohen refines Rawls' concept of the just society by removing incentives for selfish talented individuals. Cohen believes that such society would be highly efficient and equal, but in the same time Cohen leaves a space for inequalities, based on three sources: compensations for special burdened jobs, some motivational incentives and personal prerogatives. The article argues that, due to these sources of inequalities, Cohen's concept of the just society may eventually be less unequal than Rawls', but it cannot be an equal society.