Conference paper
https://doi.org/10.31141/zrpfs.2026.63.159.77
The Control of Independent Administrative Authorities: Between Dependence and Accountability
Francesco Martucci
; Université Panthéon-Assas, Pariz 2
Abstract
This contribution examines the control of independent administrative authorities (AAI) and
independent public authorities (API), starting from the constitutional paradox they embody: while
Article 20 of the Constitution entrusts the administration to the Government, the law grants these
authorities independence. Having become guarantors of the general interest in the regulation of
numerous sectors and in the protection of fundamental rights, and endowed with ever-growing
powers, they are in search of a legitimacy that their very independence renders delicate. The author
shows that this tension is resolved through a twofold control. On the one hand, jurisdictional control,
a limit on independence in the service of the rule of law: the Constitutional Council frames their
regulatory and sanctioning powers, while the judge - most often administrative, sometimes ordinary
owing to jurisdictional dualism - reviews the legality of their action, now including soft-law acts (the
Fairvesta and Numéricable case law of 2016) and, for authorities endowed with legal personality,
their liability. On the other hand, political control, respectful of independence in the service of
democratic legitimacy: in the absence of classic political responsibility, the authorities account for
their action before Parliament, in line with the accountability obligations (annual reports, hearings)
established by the laws of 20 January 2017, following a logic of accountability close to that of the
European Central Bank. Finally, the author underlines the new threat posed to these authorities by
the pressure of social media in the society of the digital spectacle.
Keywords
independent administrative authorities; judicial review; accountability; rule of law; democratic legitimacy
Hrčak ID:
347923
URI
Publication date:
31.3.2026.
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