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COULD A “YELLOW CARD” FOR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS STRENGTHEN JUDICIAL AS WELL AS POLITICAL POLICING OF SUBSIDIARITY?
Derrick Wyatt
Sažetak
It is argued that subsidiarity should be interpreted, in accordance
with the principle of effectiveness, as requiring that the Community
should only act where the objectives of the proposed action
can only be achieved at Community level. Subsidiarity has not so far
been an effective brake on action by the European institutions, and
the Court’s scrutiny of Community acts for compliance with subsidiarity
has been undemanding. The Constitution Treaty seeks to confi rm
and strengthen application of subsidiarity. Monitoring by national
parliaments, and in particular the possibility for one third to object
to a proposal on subsidiarity grounds, thus “showing a yellow card,”
could lead to improved compliance with subsidiarity by the lawmaking
institutions; and the “yellow card” procedure could change the
dynamics of judicial enforcement of subsidiarity. Where national parliaments
“raised a yellow card,” but the Commission maintained its
draft, one possibility (which the present writer would advocate) would
be that in any subsequent judicial proceedings the Court of Justice
would require the Commission to demonstrate that the national parliaments
had made a manifest error of appraisal in objecting to the
draft act on subsidiarity grounds. Giving teeth to subsidiarity by entrusting
national parliaments with responsibility for monitoring its
application, and reinforcing that responsibility with an appropriate
judicial response from the Court of Justice, could enhance the sense
of “ownership” of the European project at national level. Although it
appears unlikely that the Constitution Treaty will come into force, that
fact need not prevent the introduction by other means of subsidiarity
monitoring by national parliaments, and the adoption by the Court of
Justice of the approach indicated.
Ključne riječi
Hrčak ID:
28513
URI
Datum izdavanja:
3.11.2006.
Posjeta: 1.428 *