hrcak mascot   Srce   HID

Original scientific paper

Relative Modality and the Ability to do Otherwise

Ralph Weir

Fulltext: english, pdf (235 KB) pages 47-61 downloads: 183* cite
APA 6th Edition
Weir, R. (2016). Relative Modality and the Ability to do Otherwise. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 12 (1), 47-61. Retrieved from https://hrcak.srce.hr/175168
MLA 8th Edition
Weir, Ralph. "Relative Modality and the Ability to do Otherwise." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 1, 2016, pp. 47-61. https://hrcak.srce.hr/175168. Accessed 19 Sep. 2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Weir, Ralph. "Relative Modality and the Ability to do Otherwise." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12, no. 1 (2016): 47-61. https://hrcak.srce.hr/175168
Harvard
Weir, R. (2016). 'Relative Modality and the Ability to do Otherwise', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 12(1), pp. 47-61. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/175168 (Accessed 19 September 2021)
Vancouver
Weir R. Relative Modality and the Ability to do Otherwise. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2016 [cited 2021 September 19];12(1):47-61. Available from: https://hrcak.srce.hr/175168
IEEE
R. Weir, "Relative Modality and the Ability to do Otherwise", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.12, no. 1, pp. 47-61, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://hrcak.srce.hr/175168. [Accessed: 19 September 2021]

Abstracts
It is widely held that for an action to be free it must be the case that the agent can do otherwise. Compatibilists and incompatibilists disagree over what this ability amounts to. Two recent articles offer novel perspectives on the debate by employing Angelika Kratzer’s semantics of ‘can’. Alex Grzankowski proposes that Kratzer’s semantics favour incompatibilism because they make valid a version of the Consequence Argument. Christian List argues that Kratzer’s semantics favour a novel form of compatibilism. I argue that List’s compatibilist application of Kratzer’s semantics faces problems not faced by Grzankowski’s incompatibilist employment of them. On the other hand I argue that Kratzer’s semantics make Grzankowski’s version of the Consequence Argument valid only at the cost of rendering it dialectically useless. Contrary to both views Kratzer’s semantics do not appear to add substantial weight to either side of the compatibilism/incompatibilism dispute.

Keywords
free will; determinism; compatibilism; consequence argument

Hrčak ID: 175168

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/175168

Visits: 401 *