Izvorni znanstveni članak
Are psychiatric kinds real?
Helen Beebee
Nigel Sabbarton-Leary
Sažetak
The paper considers whether psychiatric kinds can be natural kinds and concludes that they can. This depends, however, on a particular conception of ‘natural kind’. We briefly describe and reject two standard accounts – what we call the ‘stipulative account’ (according to which apparently a priori criteria, such as the possession of intrinsic essences, are laid down for natural kindhood) and the ‘Kripkean account’ (according to which the natural kinds are just those kinds that obey Kripkean semantics). We then rehearse a more permissive account: Richard Boyd’s ‘homeostatic property cluster’ (HPC) account. We argue that psychiatric kinds can in principle count as natural kinds on the HPC account. Moreover, specific psychiatric kinds (Tourette’s, schizophrenia, etc.) can be natural kinds even if the category psychiatric disorder is not itself a natural kind.
Ključne riječi
natural kind; psychiatric kind; homeostatic property cluster
Hrčak ID:
63453
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.2.2010.
Posjeta: 1.822 *