European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 15 No. 2, 2019.

Sadržaj

Puni tekst

Special issue of EuJAP: Free Will and Epistemology (str. 5-12)

Robert Lockie, László Bernáth, András Szigeti, Timothy O’Connor
Uvodnik

To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Free Will (str. 13-32)

Nadine Elzein, Tuomas K. Pernu
Izvorni znanstveni članak

Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom (str. 33-54)

Luca Zanetti
Izvorni znanstveni članak

Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating? (str. 55-78)

Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette
Izvorni znanstveni članak

How Do We Know That We Are Free? (str. 79-98)

Timothy O’Connor
Izvorni znanstveni članak

The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory (str. 99-120)

Andrew J. Latham
Izvorni znanstveni članak

Can Self-determined Actions be Predictable? (str. 121-140)

Amit Pundik
Izvorni znanstveni članak

Posjeta: 14.688 *