Izvorni znanstveni članak
Intrinsic, hence Real; Extrinsic, hence Unreal? The Modal and Sortal Properties of Continuants
Márta Ujvári
; Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Corvinus University of Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
Sažetak
Eliminativist metaphysicians have recently explored various arguments, including those about over-determination, colocation, the problem of the Many and ontological parsimony, for dispensing with kinds and their token continuants. Further, David Lewis’s missing “real temporary intrinsics” has paved the way to treating the sortal and the modal properties yielding the persistence conditions of continuants as unreal because they are extrinsic. In this paper I show, first, that none of the arguments mentioned above are decisive against the disputed entities. Second, I argue that the sortal/modal properties, while extrinsic, are also real, because they are constitutive of kinds. The general point is that modal conceptualism should not be conflated with a cheap version of semanticism. The position advocated here is based on closing the gap between the metaphysical and the epistemic perspectives.
Ključne riječi
Continuants; extrinsic; intrinsic; kinds; modal conceptualism
Hrčak ID:
68311
URI
Datum izdavanja:
30.5.2011.
Posjeta: 3.795 *