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The Ad Hominem argument against 'Knowledge is true belief': a reply to Martens
Scott F. Aikin
; Vanderbilt Universit
Sažetak
In this article I will detail the short-comings
that exist in the cognitive account of the
emotion objectless fear, principally, though
not exclusively, as it is presented in the work
of William Lyons. I will use my critique of
Lyons’s causal-evaluative theory to act as a point
of transition or pathway towards Heidegger’s
description of Angst as it is detailed in Being and
Time. I argue that objectless fear cannot simply be
dismissed as a mislabelled mood, as claimed by
Martha Nussbaum or, as Lyons suggests, that its
object is merely vague or imponderable. Rather,
it is my contention that genuine objectless fear
(or Angst) is best understood as an ontologically
important means of revealing our authentic and
inauthentic possibilities.
Ključne riječi
emotion/mood analysis; objectless fear; Angst, cognition; causal-evaluative theory; Martin Heidegger; Being and Time; ontology
Hrčak ID:
70316
URI
Datum izdavanja:
12.7.2011.
Posjeta: 941 *