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What is wrong with Reid's criticism of Hume on moral approbation?

Laurent Jaffro


Puni tekst: engleski pdf 143 Kb

str. 11-26

preuzimanja: 800

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Sažetak

In his "Essays on the Active Powers", Thomas Rreid criticises Hume’s theory of moral judgment and argues that it is untenable. The aim of this paper is to show that shares more with his target than is ordinarily acknowledged. The author suggests that the opposition between “cognitivism” and “non-cognitivism” concerning the role of feelings in moral judgment tends to obscure (disputable) assumptions held in common by both philosophers about the nature of feelings.

Ključne riječi

emotions, moral judgment, expressivism, moral cognitivism, David Hume, Thomas Reid

Hrčak ID:

92066

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/92066

Posjeta: 966 *