Izvorni znanstveni članak
Could Hume Save His Account of Personal Identity? On the Role of Contiguity in the Constitution of Our Idea of Personal Identity
Fauve Lybaert
; University of Leuven, Institute of Philosophy, Brussels, Belgium
Sažetak
Why does my imagination form the idea that I have one diachronic identity? I argue that this is the question which Hume asks himself when he reflects on personal identity in the first book of his Treatise on Human Nature. I recite Hume’s initial answer to this question, as well as the problem which he, in the Treatise’s appendix, famously admitted to have with this answer. I demonstrate how Hume could save his account of the formation of our idea of personal identity, if he would refer to insights which he developed elsewhere and then choose not to apply to the case of personal identity, i.e. if he would consider the role of contiguity in the constitution of our idea of personal identity.
Ključne riječi
Bodily continuity; contiguity; Hume; imagination; personal identity; self-consciousness
Hrčak ID:
93134
URI
Datum izdavanja:
30.11.2012.
Posjeta: 1.547 *