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About Aboutness
Nathan Salmon
Sažetak
A Russellian notion of what it is for a proposition to be “directly about” something in particular is defined. Various strong and weak, and mediate
and immediate, Russellian notions of general (direct or indirect) aboutness are then defined in terms of Russellian direct aboutness. In particular,
a proposition is about something iff the proposition is either directly, or strongly indirectly, about that thing. A competing Russellian account, due to Kaplan, is criticized through a distinction between knowledge by description and denoting by description. The epistemological significance of Russellian aboutness is assessed. A Russellian substitute for de re propositional attitude is considered.
Ključne riječi
Russellian propositions; direct and indirect aboutness; knowledge by acquaintance and by description; denoting; de re propositional attitudes
Hrčak ID:
93213
URI
Datum izdavanja:
30.10.2007.
Posjeta: 1.564 *