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On the Absence of an Interface: Putnam, Direct Perception, and Frege's Constraint

Stephen L. White

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 533 Kb

str. 11-28

preuzimanja: 486



Hilary Putnam and John McDowell have each
argued against representational realist theories
of perception and in favor of direct realist (or
“common-sense realist”) alternatives. I claim
that in both cases they beg the question against
their representational realist opponents. Moreover,
in neither case has any alternative been
offered to the representational realist position
where the solution to perceptual or demonstrative
versions of Frege’s problem is concerned. In
this paper I present a transcendental argument
that some of our perceptions of external objects
must be direct in the sense that we perceive them
and there is nothing else we perceive in virtue of
which we do so. I also present a reply to standard
objections to the claim that transcendental
arguments can be used to support conclusions
about the world and not simply about our own
use of concepts. Finally, I present a theory in
terms of which the relevant Frege problems can
be solved without appeal to any of the sorts of
representations in terms of which representational
realism is defined.

Ključne riječi

Hilary Putnam, perception, representation, Frege’s Problem, transcendental argument

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