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Goran Gretić ; Fakultet političkih znanosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, Hrvatska

Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 122 Kb

str. 109-127

preuzimanja: 716



Rousseau gives an account of the development of law wherein the constitution
of the state is derived from the droits de l’humanite principle. In other words,
he seeks and finds the original act which encompasses equality and freedom
and from which the two result, and which is simultaneously the constitutive
act of the community. In his philosophical doctrine of the state, and in contrast
with his ethics, he discovered a new field of human obligations in and of
themselves, where the principle according to which they are judged is not the
ethical sentiment, but reason, as that which realizes that the obligations are
justified. This means that the typical anthropological foundation of equality
demanded by Rousseau’s ethics proves to be insufficient with regard to the
highest principles of the state doctrine. Thus Rousseau’s foundation of equality
in the form of a peculiar philosophy of freedom, which stands in opposition
to his ethics, is of a purely rational character, since only pure reason is the
source of cognition regarding conditions that justify coercive power over people,
and it is, in turn, clearly opposed to the source of knowledge of good and
evil, namely sensitivity and sentiments. This also clarifies Rousseau’s view
that ethical freedom is possible solely within the state and that only a citizen
of the state can have freedom. But belief in the possibility of freedom within
the state does not originate from some sort of adoration of the state: it results
from his non-abandonment of the ethics of sentimentality, with simultaneous
recognition of the validity of the freedom concept gained in the sphere
of the legislative state. In Kant’s understanding, the basic goal of Rousseau’s
political thought was to establish and ensure inalienable natural rights of individuums,
which are symbolized in the substance of the general will. One may
therefore conclude that they both tried to establish a new metaphysics of law,
but this does not mean that Rousseau can be considered a direct predecessor of
Kant’s metaphysics of ethics and his critique of practical reason.

Ključne riječi

freedom; general will; ethics of sentimentality; legislation of rational will; doctrine of the state; Rousseau; Kant

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