Izvorni znanstveni članak
Moral Responsibility Beyond Classical Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Accounts
Sofia Bonicalzi
; Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici, Sezione di Filosofia, Italia
Sažetak
The concept of “moral responsibility” has almost always been defined in relation to a certain idea of metaphysical freedom and to a conception of the physical world. So, classically, for indeterminist thinkers, human beings are free and therefore responsible, if their choices are not defined by a previous state of the world but derive from an autonomous selection among a set of alternatives. Differently, for the majority of determinist philosophers (the so-called “soft compatibilists”), the only form of freedom we need has to be identified with freedom of the conduct, considered as opposite to any form of coercion. Some argue that, given the truth of determinism and the related suppression of concepts such as “guilt” and “praise”, or “merit” and “demerit”, morality could survive just as a utilitarian tool, even though this seems to be in conflict with our deepest feelings and practices. Considering some revisionist approaches of moral responsibility in connection with classical positions (synthetically presented in the first part of the paper), I will reconstruct some of the attempts to release responsibility from the thematisation of freedom, exploring the possibility of redefining it as an independent concept. My conclusion is that the focus on the choice-action process and on the characteristics of the “self”, avoiding reference to alternative scenarios, could be a good starting point for elaborating a conception of what really counts for our moral life – even though, in the end, this could entail the abandonment of the traditional concept of responsibility itself.
Ključne riječi
Compatibilism; free will; incompatibilism; moral responsibility
Hrčak ID:
104309
URI
Datum izdavanja:
28.6.2013.
Posjeta: 1.736 *