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A Defence of Broome’s First-Order Model of Practical Reasoning
David Botting
orcid.org/0000-0002-5314-3625
; Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 26-C Av. de Berna, Lisbon, Portugal
Sažetak
In this paper I will consider criticisms that have been raised against Broome’s first-order model of practical reasoning by Bratman, Brunero, and Høj. I will modify Broome’s exposition so that it is no longer vulnerable to these objections. The main modification I will make is that I will take the principle Broome dubs the “beliefintention link” to express a pragmatic implicature instead of a material implication, on the basis of which implicatures the process of reasoning Broome describes reaches the conclusion-states Broome desires to reach. This makes a cognitivist account of at least some norms of practical rationality plausible.
Ključne riječi
Bratman; Broome; cognitivism; coherence; instrumental principle; practical rationality
Hrčak ID:
121972
URI
Datum izdavanja:
29.5.2014.
Posjeta: 1.078 *