Izvorni znanstveni članak
The Doxastic Requirement of Scientific Explanation and Understanding
Seungbae Park
orcid.org/0000-0001-5421-9700
; Division of General Studies, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulju-gun, Ulsan 689–798, Republic of Korea
Sažetak
Van Fraassen (1980) and Winther (2009) claim that we can explain phenomena in terms of scientific theories without believing that they are true. I argue that we ought to believe that they are true in order to use them to explain and understand phenomena. A scientific antirealist who believes that scientific theories are merely empirically adequate cannot use them to explain or to understand phenomena. The mere belief that they are empirically adequate produces neither explanation nor understanding of phenomena. Explanation and understanding are the benefits of science only a scientific realist is entitled to.
Ključne riječi
Belief; empirical adequacy; explanation; Moore’s paradox; truth
Hrčak ID:
129627
URI
Datum izdavanja:
19.11.2014.
Posjeta: 2.720 *