Izvorni znanstveni članak

Moral Laws, Laws of Nature and Dispositions

Danny Frederick orcid.org/0000-0003-3011-0393 ; Slate House, Hunstan Lane, Old Leake, Boston, PE22 9RG, United Kingdom

Sažetak

It appears that light may be thrown on the nature of moral principles if they are construed as moral laws analogous to ceteris-paribus laws of nature. Luke Robinson objects that the analogy either cannot explain how moral principles are necessary or cannot explain how obligations can be pro-tanto; and that a dispositional account of moral obligation has explanatory superiority over one in terms of moral laws. I outline the analogy, construing laws of nature as necessary relationships after the fashion of William Kneale and Karl Popper. I then show that Robinson’s objections are mistaken and that if the difference between a dispositional account and a law account is not merely verbal, then it is the law account that is superior. I also dispel the common confusion between the necessity of laws and the existence of forces.

Ključne riječi

Ceteris paribus; disposition; explanation; force; law of nature; moral law; necessity; pro tanto

Hrčak ID:

129629

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/129629

Datum izdavanja:

19.11.2014.

Posjeta: 1.335 *