Izvorni znanstveni članak
Can We Do Without a Metaphysical Theory of Personal Identity in Practice?
Radim Bělohrad
; Department of Philosophy, Masaryk University in Brno
Sažetak
In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit’s theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard’s claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston’s contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these theories have a point, they do not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought. It is in these situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place.
Ključne riječi
Justification; metaphysics; personal identity; practical concerns
Hrčak ID:
129630
URI
Datum izdavanja:
19.11.2014.
Posjeta: 1.910 *