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Can We Do Without a Metaphysical Theory of Personal Identity in Practice?

Radim Bělohrad ; Department of Philosophy, Masaryk University in Brno

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 152 Kb

str. 315-334

preuzimanja: 882



In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit’s theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard’s claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston’s contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these theories have a point, they do not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought. It is in these situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place.

Ključne riječi

Justification, metaphysics, personal identity, practical concerns

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