Professional paper

Evolution of cooperation in Noweg-Sigmunds iterated prisoner's dilemma

Jurica Hižak orcid.org/0000-0002-8394-5581 ; Sveučilište Sjever, Sveučilišni centar Varaždin, Varaždin, Hrvatska

Abstract

This paper describes the method and the results of a research that Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund published 1992 in Nature in an article entitled "Tit for tat in heterogeneous populations." Through computer-simulated tournament of iterated prisoner's dilemma, the authors showed that the strategy "Tit for Tat" ( TFT) is essential for the emergence of cooperation in a heterogeneous group of players. Their simulation shows that initially mixed population of players evolves to the extinction of almost all strategies except renegades, and then there is a sudden increase in TFT players. Moreover, the simulation shows that TFT is not really the end of evolution, but the beginning of the predominance of a more generous strategy. According to the authors, TFT is a pivot, rather than the end point of an evolution towards cooperation.

Keywords

evolution of cooperation; iterated prisoner’s dilemma; Tit for tat strategy

Hrčak ID:

140751

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/140751

Publication date:

15.6.2015.

Article data in other languages: croatian

Visits: 1.554 *