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Sceptical and Practical Criticisms of Epistemic Externalism

Martin Nuhliček orcid.org/0000-0002-7570-5318 ; Comenius University, Philosophical Faculty, Department of Philosophy and History of Philosophy, Gondova 2, 81499 Bratislava, Slovak Republic

Sažetak

The paper introduces and discusses two different types of criticisms of epistemic externalism. First, there are criticisms of externalism which I call sceptical criticisms. So-called sceptical critics state that the externalist conception of justification leads to the consequence that no belief is justified and hence no belief constitutes knowledge. I defend the claim that sceptical criticisms of epistemic externalism are
generally wrong, because the conclusion which they infer from available premises is too strong. However, I suggest that epistemic externalism can be effectively criticized to be implausible, but for different reasons. I introduce a second type of criticisms which I call practical criticisms of epistemic externalism. So-called practical critics argue that from the externalist point of view it is impossible to identify the epistemic status of beliefs. This means, in turn, that even if the externalist conception of justification was true, it would be practically useless, and therefore implausible.

Ključne riječi

Epistemic externalism; epistemic internalism; Gettier problem; justification; knowledge

Hrčak ID:

141860

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/141860

Datum izdavanja:

16.7.2015.

Posjeta: 1.508 *