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Reasons for Popper's Scientific Realism

Andrej Ule

Sažetak

Popper holds scientific realism for a metaphysical frame of his theory of science and of science itself. The main thesis of scientific realism by Popper is the presupposition of the independent existence of reality and of correspondence theory of truth. The reality is conceivable and structured by some laws of nature. Popper doesn't need realism as the support for his falsificationism, because realism is compatible with some kind of anti-realism too. Popper needs realism because of his believing in the inner coincidence of the four main forms of scientific progress: the progress in the scientific explanations (and predictions), the progress in the corroboratation of theories, the progress in the solutions of scientific problems, and the progress in the verisimilitude. The coincidence of all these kinds of the progress could point to a greater approach of a theory to the reality, but it does not prove it. Striving after this coincidence can sometimes exclude some interesting new theories from the further research. Popper’s realism is also too weak in interpretation of the reference of theoretical terms, like for instance in modern microphysics.

Ključne riječi

REALISM; FALSIFICATION; VERISIMILITUDE; REALITY; EXPLANATORY POWER; CORROBORATION

Hrčak ID:

14482

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/14482

Datum izdavanja:

30.6.2003.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 2.278 *