Skoči na glavni sadržaj

Izvorni znanstveni članak

On Aristotelian Universals and Individuals: The “Vink” that is in Body and May Be In Me

Irena Cronin ; University of California, Los Angeles, USA

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 97 Kb

str. 341-348

preuzimanja: 254



G. E. L. Owen, in his infl uential paper “Inherence,” talks of “vink,” a name he has created for a particular shade of the color pink, and this “vink” serves as an individual in the Aristotelian category of quality. Owen was one of the first to aim to discredit the belief that J. L. Ackrill and his camp espoused, the belief that Aristotle thought that “general attributes are not in individuals, particular attributes are not in more than one individual.” I postulate that there is nothing here that does not preclude the existence of transferable nonsubstantial particulars, and base this view on passages from Aristotle’s Categories and certain examples found in Ammonius’s commentary and On Colors. Given this, a nonsubstantial particular of “vink” would not have to rely on having inhered in just one particular body to have existence, however, it would have to inhere in at least one particular body.

Ključne riječi

Universals, particulars, Owen, Ackrill, Aristotle

Hrčak ID:



Posjeta: 560 *