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Superficially and Deeply Contingent A Priori Truths

Marco Ruffino ; University of Campinas (UNICAMP) / CNPq, Brazil

Sažetak

In this paper, I review some standard approaches to the cases of contingent a priori truths that emerge from Kripke’s (1980) discussion of proper names and Kaplan’s (1989) theory of indexicals. In particular, I discuss Evans’ (1979) distinction between superficially and deeply contingent truths. I shall raise doubts about Evans’ strategy in general, and also about the roots and meaningfulness of the distinction.

Ključne riječi

Contingent a priori truths; rigid designation; contingency; descriptive names; Gareth Evans

Hrčak ID:

180171

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/180171

Datum izdavanja:

13.9.2016.

Posjeta: 1.530 *