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Zimmermann about Intentionality

Ljudevit Hanžek ; Sveučilište u Splitu, Filozofski fakultet

Sažetak

Zimmermann understands intentionality as essential relationality, ie the relation of a mental state with its object. Although he doesn’t subscribe to the thesis of intentionality as the mark of the mental, he does claim that intentionality is a suitable criterion for classification of mental states into mutually exclusive categories. Contrary to those statements, there does not seem to be a clear conception of intentionality present in his works, nor it seems that intentionality plays the intended explanatory role. Zimmermann more often uses another distinction while classifying mental states, that between sensory and spiritual ones, which he often adduces detailed arguments for. In this paper I bring forth the problems with Zimmermann’s notion of intentionality and explain the alternative division of mental states found in his works. Crucial part of the arguments presented in favor of the alternative division is Zimmermann’s insistence on the existence of physiologically unconditioned moments in human cognition, prime examples of which are abstraction (construed in a scholastic manner) and relative perception. Analysis of those examples shows that they contain multiple problems, and do not provide adequate support to the claims Zimmermann bases on them.

Ključne riječi

abstraction; intentionality; perception; relative perception; sensation; sensory; spiritual; Zimmermann

Hrčak ID:

190143

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/190143

Datum izdavanja:

30.10.2017.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 1.250 *